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Full text of "Poland Russia and Great Britain 1941-1945"

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served to persuade them must Indeed have been convincing in the extreme
and for the first time in their political career they omitted their conven-
tional smile under the battery of photographers. They were beaten hands
down. . . .
They affixed their signatures to a document which recognised Russia's
right to deal with the first warrior in the Allied camp, who, as they both
claimed, had fought so valiantly for democracy and against aggression,
—to deal with their ally Poland.,—as an enemy and a bitter enemy at that.
None of Hitler's defeated satellites were subjected to a similar contemp-
tuous and humiliating usage by the Big Three.  Even Germany, in spite
of * unconditional surrender \ was promised better treatment.   At the
very most the Allies were threatening to take 15—20   per cent of her
State territory,, and furthermore, it was territory which had always been
the subject of dispute with her neighbours, while in the case of Poland,
the Big Three were agreeing that this country should lose half her territory
to Russia., land which had always been undisputedly Polish.   Germany
could expect occupation—Poland annexation.    It seemed to the Poles
that it was better to be a German, surrendering unconditionally to the
Anglo-Americans, who would at least   treat   him according to some
standards of Christian culture, than to be a Pole who would find himself
under £ friendly * Russian protection and, in this ( close alliance *, could
expect a similar treatment as had been accorded his compatriots in Eastern
Poland in 1939—1941.
The leaders of the three Greatest Powers of the world were settling
the future status of Poland, the Ally of the two of them, endeavouring
to compose her Government and decide her frontiers without asking
or even mentioning the proceedings to her legal Government, who
had conducted the struggle against the common enemy both in the
country itself and outside for over five years. Even in the Munich Agree-
ment the signatories had not gone so far as to annihilate its government
when they presided over the partitioning of Czecho-Slovakia. As matters
stood, the state organisation of Poland might indeed never have existed
as far as the Big Three were concerned.
" It was not as an undefined national group that Poland entered the war,"
wrote The Tablet, " but as a sovereign State, placing at our disposal not
mercenaries which we might have hired, but the armed forces of a sovereign
State, under the terms of an alliance concluded two days after the Russo-
Gerrnan non-aggression Pact. Yet the language of the Crimea Declaration
entirely disregards the existence of the Polish State, with its legal continuity,
Government, territory, citizens and armed forces, envisaging instead a loose
national group upon which the attributes of a State, territory and a govern-
ment are to be bestowed by the benevolent Powers. There could be no
clearer demonstration of the changed approach to world order."
This unwarranted attempt to enforce an alien government on the
cotantry of an Ally, was in direct contradiction to all the edicts of the
Atlantic Charter, and to those principles for which the United States,
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